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With the internationalization of infectious disease, increased globaliza-
tion of economic transactions, and technological innovation, we are at a
critical juncture in decision-making about pharmaceutical regulation. Ad-
vances in medical research have yielded significant improvements in treat-
ing diseases that only recently were incurable. This is most stunning in the
area of AIDS treatments. Significant public and private investment, par-
ticularly in the United States, converted this killer into a manageable
chronic disorder for many in the developed world. Simultaneously, an ex-
plosion in the infection rate in poor countries has made AIDS a largely de-
veloping world disease. As a result, the high-priced life saving drugs are
largely unavailable to what amounts to 90% of the infected population.
* Paper written for Fellowship, Center for International Studies, New York University
School of Law.
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The devastation of the AIDS pandemic and the management of a pub-
lic health solution present a daunting challenge to global governance on
many fronts. A critical source of conflict at the end of the millennium arose
from the tension between forces favoring preservation of commercial inter-
est in patent rights and the compelling need for poorer countries to get ac-
cess to safe medicines at an affordable price. Inaccessibly priced medicines
are at the core of a dispute that is not only North-South, but also mobilizes
transnational actors, such as AIDS treatment advocates and industry propo-
nents. A combination of the market, state regulation of patent monopolies,
and intergovernmental trade regimes manages distributional outcomes.
However, this governance structure poorly responds to this particular in-
stance of market failure. As with many problems involving economic gov-
ernance at the global level, there is a gap between the representative organs
that make up the regulatory frameworks (intergovernmental negotiators act-
ing for nationally determined economic interests) and the breadth of inter-
ests, constituted both transnationally and domestically, that are stakeholders
in policy outcomes.
International Trade
The signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(CNAFTA")I and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights ("TRIPS") 2 represented a significant departure from tradi-
tional multilateral trade diplomacy. From its creation in 1947, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT') operated through a process of
negotiating tariff reductions on goods. In the 1990s, this gradual reduction
of tariff (and some non-tariff) barriers to the free flow of commodities was
supplemented with the establishment of enforceable global standards gov-
erning intellectual property.
The inclusion of intellectual property rights as a critical aspect of trade
negotiations flowed logically from the explosive growth of value generated
by intellectual property in industries such as software and biotechnology.
Strong intellectual property protections in an otherwise unregulated market
are rationalized as necessary interventions to encourage innovation by guar-
anteeing sufficient return on investment in the development of intellectual
property. Rights holders are then able to enjoy monopoly rents on their in-
ventions, a policy which must be balanced with opposing social goals of
promoting competition and affordability of consumer goods. By establish-
ing positive protection of "rights" for investors in innovation, the global
'North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 612 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
2 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter Marrakesh
Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTs-REsULTS OF THE URUGUAY RouND Vol. 31,
33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
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trade regime governs the complex balance of interests between intellectual
property owners, second-comers in the market, and consumers.
Managing this balance is particularly tricky in the case of pharmaceuti-
cals. Unlike most other consumer goods, access to essential medicines is a
basic human need, and an important aspect of many national health policies.
According to the World Health Organization ("WHO"), access involves
three components: therapeutic access (the discovery and development of
appropriate treatments), physical access, and financial access. Financial
access is greatly affected by the ability of pharmaceutical companies to ex-
ercise monopoly control of pricing through exclusive patent rights. At the
level of international trade diplomacy, the tradeoff between protection and
access takes on a North-South dimension. Where comparative advantage
depends on monopoly of intellectual property, developing countries are at a
distinct disadvantage. Once intellectual property is part of the international
trade regime, the dynamics of access to essential pharmaceuticals can be
shaped in this arena.4 Through active lobbying, international pharmaceuti-
cal companies succeeded in ob" g a high level of pharmaceutical patent
protections in the trade agreements. Increasingly, poor countries affected
by the AIDS pandemic and international health organizations actively have
sought to preserve state regulatory powers within the confines of the TRIPS
agreement.6 However, these efforts have been met with considerable resis-
tance, particularly from the United States, which has engaged in aggressive
3 See generally World Health Organization, at http//:www.who.int (ast modified Mar. 6,
2001).
4 See Sara Dillon, Fuji-Kodak, the WTO, and the Death ofDomestic Political Constituen-
cies, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 197, 203 - 203 (1999) (arguing that increased legalism at the
international level has eclipsed the ability of domestic constituencies to affect national poli-
cies).
5 See Robert Weissman, Long Strange Trips: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to
Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives
Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PENN. J. INT'L LAW 1069 (1996).6See Revised Drug Strategy, Res. WHA 52.19, Fifty-Second World Health Assembly,
May 24, 1999.
Recognizing that the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS) provides scope for the protection of public health;
Taking note of concerns of many Member States about the impact of relevant in-
ternational agreements, including trade agreements, on local manufacturing capacity
and on access to and prices of pharmaceuticals in developing and least developed
countries;
1. URGES Member States:...
(3) to explore and review their options under relevant international agreements,
including trade agreements, to safeguard access to essential drugs.
Id.
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unilateral action to extend patent protection beyond the international
agreements.7
This paper examines the current conflicts surrounding the implementa-
tion of patent protection for pharmaceuticals. Part II outlines the specifics
of trade agreements shaping the global intellectual property regime and the
consequences for governments seeking to devise an essential drugs policy.
Part III analyzes the process of obtaining consensus and compliance with
patent protection rules through the negotiation and implementation of trade
agreements, and the utilization of dispute settlement mechanisms. This sec-
tion also examines the aggressive application of unilateral measures to in-
duce adherence to levels of protection beyond those established at the
multilateral and regional level. Part IV considers alternative approaches for
international governance of pharmaceuticals that aim to maximize equitable
outcomes while preserving incentives for innovation.
II. HARMONIZATION OF PATENT REGIMES
The Interaction ofRegional and Multilateral Initiatives
The core GATT principles of national treatment and most favored na-
tion status are incorporated in the two agreements. Both TRIPS and
NAFTA provide that each Member (or "Party" in the case of NAFTA) re-
quires that nationals of other participating states may not be treated less fa-
vorably in domestic protection and enforcement of intellectual property
legislation! Most-favored-nation treatment (included in Article 4 of the
TRIPS) mandates that any advantage conferred to one member country
must be extended to all other member countries. However, trade advan-
tages provided within NAFTA most likely are not required to be extended
to GATT members. The exception provided within the GATT, permitting
customs unions and free trade areas, will probably be applied to World
Trade Organization ("WTO") agreements.9
Although the increase in regional trade integration initiatives in the
1980s raised concerns about potential weakening of the multilateral frame-
7 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Announces Results of Spe-
cial 301 Annual Review (Apr. 30, 1999), at http://www.ustr.gov/releasesl1999/04/99-41.html
[hereinafter Special 301 Annual Review].
8 TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 3; NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1703.
9 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194, Art. XXIV [hereinafter GATT]. See generally J.H. Reichman, Universal
Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPS Component of the
WTO Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Carlos M. Correa
& Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998). But see Frederick M. Abbott, LAW AND POLICY OF
REGIONAL INTEGRATION 95-96 (1995) (arguing that because the TRIPS agreement itself does
not contain an exemption for regional integration areas, higher levels of protection within
NAFTA should extend to certain countries).
382
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work, this largely has proven to be of limited significance, especially with
the strengthening of the multilateral system through conclusion of the Uru-
guay Round of the GATT.'° Rather, at least for the purposes considered
here, the shift in U.S. emphasis toward the North American trade arrange-
ment served to bolster its intellectual property agenda at the multilateral
level." The NAFTA Chapter 17 provisions were negotiated at the same
time as TRIPS by mostly the same people, so much of the language in the
two agreements is virtually identical or strikingly similar.12 Intellectual
property was included in the GATT Uruguay Round and the NAFTA due to
U.S. insistence.' 3 Although they are largely the same, the United States was
more successful at securing its agenda in the NAFTA accord than in TRIPS.
NAFTA Chapter 17 provisions are often referred to as "TRIPS-plus."'
4
Minimum Standards
The TRIPS and NAFTA intellectual property provisions are excep-
tional instances of the imposition of minimum standards on domestic legal
systems.' 5  Other aspects of the trade agreements that address domestic
regulatory regimes, such as the Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade
and on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, 16 mandate
limiting constraints on regulations for technical or health purposes. The ob-
jective of those provisions is reducing non-tariff barriers to trade, rather
than creating internationally enforceable domestic regimes to protect tech-
nical and sanitary conditions.' 7 The NAFTA Supplemental Agreements on
1o See Roy Maclaren, The Geo-Political Changes During the 1980s and Their Influence
on the GATT, in Tm URUGUAY RoUND AND BEYOND 189 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Mathias
Hirsch eds., 1998). See generally MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM AFTER THE
URUGUAY RoUND (Riccardo Faini & Enzo Grilli eds., 1997).
" See James A.R. Nafziger, NAFTA's Regime for Intellectual Property: In the Main-
stream of Public International Law, in UNAM/ASIL, EL PAPEL DEL DERECHO
INTERNACIONAL EN AMERICA: LA SOBERANIA NACIONAL EN LA ERA DE LA INTEGRACION
REGIONAL 377, 384 (1997).
12 See Joseph Papovich , NAF7A 's Provisions Regarding Intellectual Property: Are They
Working as Intended? -A US. Perspective, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 253 (1997). Joseph Papovich
served as the Deputy Assistant Trade Representative for Intellectual Property in the Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative.
13 See id. at 254.
14 See Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: Intellectual Property Under NAFTA, Invest-
ment and Protection Agreements and the World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261,
266 (1997).
15 The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures ("TRIMS"), part of the Mar-
rakesh Agreement, also establishes positive requirements, but it does not entail the same
quantity of elaboration with respect to highly specific harmonizing rules.
16 These were also included in the Marrakesh Agreement. See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch.
9, Standards Related Measures.
17 See Hertz, supra note 14, at 266 (citing Frieder Roessler, former Director of the WTO
Secretariat's Legal Affairs Division).
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Labor and the Environment 8 do require that parties enforce positive labor
and environmental standards, but those agreements only require the en-
forcement of domestic laws, not the revision of domestic laws to meet an
internationally negotiated standard. At most, the Supplemental Agreements
contain vague aspirational statements about enacting protective legisla-
tion.19 By contrast, both the TRIPS and Chapter 17 of NAFTA contain
fairly detailed requirements for levels of domestic regulation of intellectual
property rights. In both cases, parties may provide more extensive coverage
to property rights than required by the Agreements.20
Rights ofPatent-holders
The substantive provisions most relevant to pharmaceuticals are found
in Section 5 of the TRIPS, and in NAFTA Article 1709 covering patents.
TRIPS provides that patent holders are to receive the exclusive rights to
prevent third parties from making, using, offering for sale, selling, or im-
porting the product or process without the owner's consent.2 ' Rights articu-
lated in NAFTA are similar, but do not include the prevention of third
parties from importing patented products, only from importing products de-
rived from patented processes. This omission avoids directly addressing
the problem of parallel imports, or "gray market" goods. The TRIPS simi-
larly skirts the issue by referring to Article 6, which states that "[flor pur-
poses of dispute settlement under this Agreement . . . nothing in this
Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellec-
tual property rights."23  Exhaustion of rights doctrine holds that once a
rights holder introduces protected goods into the stream of commerce, there
is no restriction on how the goods may be further distributed. The practice
of parallel imports involves the importation of lawfully made products that
were not intended for distribution in the country importing the goods.24
18 See NAFTA, North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation and North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993.
19 For example, Article 3 of the North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion provides as follows:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels of domestic envi-
ronmental development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify accordingly
its environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure that its laws and
regulations provide high levels of environmental protection and shall strive to con-
tinue to improve those laws and regulations.
Abbott, supra note 9, at 109-12.
20 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 1 (1); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1702.
21 TRIPS, supra note 2, art 28.
22NAFTA supra note 1, art. 1709(a).
2 TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 28 (1)(aXn. 6).
24 See Laurinda L. Hicks and James R. Holbein, Convergence of National Intellectual
Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POLICY 769,
810-11 (1997).
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This loophole/ambiguity is especially relevant to the parallel importation of
pharmaceuticals, as there are significant price differentials on the same
medicines legally produced in, or exported to, different countries. 25
By practicing market segmentation, pharmaceutical companies may
seek to maximize potential marginal returns in countries with low purchas-
ing power, while preserving high prices in stronger markets. Advocates of
restricting parallel importation of medicines claim that such a strategy
would encourage companies to sell at below world market prices to poorer
countries. However, in practice, poor countries are not necessarily the
beneficiaries of market segmentation. The ability to shop the world market
offers consumers the advantage of price negotiating leverage with compa-
nies .26
Under TRIPS, the term of patent protection is established at a mini-
mum of twenty years from the filing date.27 NAFTA provides for twenty
years from filing, or, alternatively, seventeen years from the date of the pat-
ent grant, as had been the longstanding U.S. policy. 28 In implementing the
TRIPS agreement, the United States revised its patent protection period to
conform with the single TRIPS standard.29 The only other change to the
U.S. patent scheme required by the agreements was nondiscrimination on
the basis of place of invention. Drugs developed in other countries must
now be afforded national treatment with respect to patent approval .3
The agreements also include extensive norms for the domestic en-
forcement of property rights. Unlike the substantive provisions, they do not
articulate specific rules, but rather general standards to allow for local dif-
ferences.3 1 The rules cover procedural matters, such as timely, evidence-
2 Price differentials are usually the result of varied approaches to price regulation in dif-
ferent countries. Parallel importing of pharmaceuticals is widely practiced within the Euro-
pean Union. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, PHAnm.cEUTIcAL PRIC E REGULATION 84-88 (1997)
(arguing that savings from parallel importation usually accrue to intermediaries rather than to
consumers).26 See Mohamed Lahouel and Keith Maskus, Competition Policy and Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights in Developing Countries: Interests in Unilateral Initiatives and a WTO Agree-
ment, WORLD BANK GLOBAL CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MILLENNIUM
ROUND (Sep. 20-21, 1999), athttpJ/redem.buap.mx/rml9.htm.27 TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 32.
28 NAFTA, supranote 1, art 1709 (12).29 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, §532(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4809,
4984 (1994) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)); see also Weissman, supra note 5, at 1074.
30 The European Union has asserted that nonetheless, delays in commercialization of me-
dicinal products developed in Europe are still longer than of U.S.-tested products, in part be-
cause of the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") approval procedures. See EUROPEAN
COMM ssION, 1999 REPORT ON UNITED STATES BARRIERS TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 25
(Aug. 1999), at http://europaeu.intlcomm/extemal_relationsus/trade-barriers_.report_99/usr
bt 99.pdf.
31 For a discussion of the challenges posed by the difficult fit between domestic rules fal-
ling within TRIPS and the dispute settlement mechanisms covering the WTO in general, see
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based judicial and administrative enforcement, the availability of judicial
review, and the provision of civil and criminal penalties. 2
Regulation ofPharmaceutical Patents
Patentable subject matter is broadly conferred to "any inventions,
whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that
they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial appli-
cation. 3 3  In legal actions involving infringement of a process patent, the
agreements shift the burden of proof to the defendant 4 Discrimination as
to place of invention, the field of technology, and whether products are im-
ported or locally produced is proscribed.35
These provisions imply a significant retooling of the patent registration
and enforcement systems of many countries. Prior to the agreements, some
countries only protected pharmaceutical processes, but not products, thus
allowing generic drug makers to legally produce substances similar to pat-
ented medicines through a distinct process.36 India implemented this
method in its Patents Act of 1970 and developed a thriving generic pharma-
ceutical industry producing cheap medicines.3 7 Until recently, some coun-
tries in the developing world, such as Brazil, did not extend any patent
protection to pharmaceuticals. 38 Additionally, the equal level of protection
mandated for imports and locally manufactured products eliminates a do-
mestic tool for promoting direct investment and technology transfer. With
the right to supply imports protected, national governments may not legis-
late "work-the-patent" rules limiting patents to products manufactured lo-
generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Andreas Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uru-
guay Round, Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997).32 See NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1714-1717; TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 41-50.
33 TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27 (1); NAFTA, supra note 2, art. 1709 (1).
34 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 34; NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (10).
35 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27 (1); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (7).36 According to one study, prior to TRIPS, only 45% of developing countries recognized
pharmaceutical product patents. Those that did so had much shorter periods of protection
than the twenty-year consensus emerging in the developed countries. See German
Velasquez and Pascale Boulet, Essential Drugs in the New International Economic Envi-
ronment, 3 BULLETIN OF Tim WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 288, 289 (1999).
37 See Elizabeth Henderson, TRIPS and the Third World: the Example of Pharmaceutical
Patents in India, 11 EuR. INTELL. PRop. RFV. 651, 657-58 (1997). Henderson notes that be-
cause of shorter patents for pharmaceuticals than for other technology (five to seven, rather
than fourteen years), and the delay in bringing pharmaceuticals to market (up to eight years)
there has been no effective patent protection for pharmaceuticals in India.38 In 1996, Brazil passed legislation that brought pharmaceutical protection in compliance
with the TRIPS requirements. See Theresa Beeby Lewis, Patent Protection for the Pharma-
ceutical Industry: A Survey of the PatentLaws of Various Countries, 30 INT'L LAw. 835, 860
(1996).
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cally, as had been permitted under the Paris Convention.39 Importation of a
patented product is thus considered sufficient to meet any requirements that
a patent be "worked".
Both agreements contain special pipeline provisions covering pharma-
ceutical and agricultural chemical products for countries that had not pro-
vided patent protection prior to the agreements coming into force. In the
case of NAFTA, parties are required to offer patent protection for the re-
mainder of the patent term granted in another party, as long as the product
has not already been marketed in the country newly offering protection.
40
The TRIPS provision, by contrast, allows countries to ease in patent protec-
tion of these areas. It requires that a filing procedure, or "mailbox" system,
be established so that the subsequent patent grant will be counted from the
filing date.4 ' This requirement only covers those patents filed from the date
of the enforcement of the agreement. 42 A product that is the subject of the
patent application must be accorded up to five years of exclusive marketing
rights until the patent application is granted or rejected. 43 Although devel-
oping countries are not required to have a fully compliant patent system un-
til 2005, 44 the pipeline requirement for pharmaceuticals expedites the
effective recognition of patents, by preserving the place in line for registra-
tion and mandating exclusive marketing in the interim.
Balancing Patent Protection with Social Needs
Despite the unprecedented level of positive rulemaking, the intellectual
property provisions of the trade agreements leave substantial room for
countries to exercise regulatory control over pharmaceutical pricing. In ad-
dition to the omission of any express prohibition on the use of parallel im-
ports, there is nothing in the agreements to bar the use of price controls, a
common practice in developed countries, with the exception of the United
States. 45
39 See Reichman, supra note 9, at 352 (citing Paris Convention for the Protection of In-
dustrial Property, art. 5A).40 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (4).
41 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 70 (8).
42 See id.
43 See id. art. 70 (9).
44 See id. art. 65 (4), which provides a 10 year transition period for developing countries
which previously did not protect pharmaceuticals to implement a product patent system.45 The wide differentials in pricing between the United States and other countries, and
among purchasers within the United States is a groving political problem for international
pharmaceutical companies. See, e.g., Jeff Gerth and Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Drug Makers
Reap Profits On Tax-Backed Research, N.Y. TnMEs, Apr. 23, 2000, at Al (offering the ex-
ample of a six-week supply of a glaucoma drug that costs a French patient $18.78, U.S. fed-
eral agencies $25.37, and a U.S. patient purchasing in a drugstore $49.69.)
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Exceptions to the rigorous standards are also specified. 46 TRIPS ex-
plicitly acknowledges the necessity of considering public interest, and spe-
cifically health policy, in formulating domestic intellectual property
regulations. In its General Provisions and Basic Principles, the agreement
allows Members to "adopt measures necessary to protect public health and
nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to
their socio-economic and technological development, provided that such
measures are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement. 'A7 The
Agreement further acknowledges the principle that intellectual property
rights must be limited so as not to be abused in the restraint of trade or "ad-
versely affect the international transfer of technology. '" 8 With the excep-
tion of competition policy, these provisions are not included in the NAFTA
agreement.
Members may exclude patents for inventions where the exclusion is
needed to protect public order or morality, including to protect human, ani-
mal, or plant life or health, or to avoid environmental injury. This state-
ment is predicated, however, on the condition that no commercial use of the
invention is permitted in the territory.49 This exception lends little support
to exempting essential drugs from patent protection requirements under the
Agreement. The public order exception essentially authorizes a state to
deny patents to harmful substances that are banned for reasons of health,
safety, or environmental protection. Robert Weissman suggests that a gov-
ernment pursuing an essential drugs policy can obviate the requirement that
no commercial use be allowed in the territory by denying patentability and
producing and distributing the target medications through a public or non-
profit entity or network. Such a scheme also would require the prohibition
of all non-public commercial exploitation of the substance. This seems to
be a stretch of the concept underlying "ordre public" and probably does not
fall within the provision, which states that the exclusion cannot be made
"merely because the exploitation is prohibited by... law."
S
Additionally, diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for the
treatment of humans or animals, and plants, animals other than micro-
46 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 30; NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (5):
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a pat-
ent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal ex-
ploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of
the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third parties.
47 TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 8 (1).
'Id. art.8 (2).
49 See id. art. 27 (2); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (2).
50 TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 27(2). Weissman argues extensively and creatively that a
country may be successful at asserting the 'necessary" nature of noncommercial exploitation
of essential medicines yet this tactic is inconsistent with the plain textual meaning of the
provision, which is to preclude patentability of harmful inventions, not inaccessibly priced
ones.
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organisms, and the biological processes for the production of plants or ani-
mals may be excluded.51 Although this provision also suggests a health ex-
ception principle in the Agreement, by its terms, it refers only to patenting
"methods" and actual life forms. The United States strongly opposed the
exclusion of life forms due to its interest in protecting the growing biotech-
nology industry. The provision of a five-year review of Article 27 was in-
cluded in the final draft of the TRIPS agreement.
52
Compulsory licensing
Compulsory licensing of patents is one of the most contentious issues
in intellectual property regulation. A compulsory or mandatory license
waives the patent holder's normally exclusive right to the invention, usually
under specified conditions, such as non-utilization, abuses in the restraint of
trade, or other circumstances creating a public interest in wider availabil-
ity.53 Payment of a royalty to the patent-holder is usually required. Com-
pulsory licensing schemes are used to control pharmaceutical prices by
allowing generic producers into the market before the patent expiration of
brand-name drugs. In the period that Canada instituted compulsory licens-
ing for pharmaceuticals (especially 1969-1987), drug prices dropped sig-
nificantly.54 The United States consistently has opposed any form of
compulsory licensing, except perhaps in extreme situations involving na-
tional security. The compulsory licensing provisions in the agreements rep-
resent a compromise to developing country interests.
Compulsory licensing is permitted under Article 31 of TRIPS and Ar-
ticle 1709 (10) in NAFTA, but is subject to a number of restrictions. Au-
thorization for use of a patent without the consent of the right holder must
be considered on its individual merits.55 Efforts to obtain a license from the
rights holder on reasonable terms for a reasonable period of time must be
made before a compulsory license may be granted. 6 Significantly, prior ef-
fort to obtain consent from the right holder may be waived "in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases
of public non-commercial use.",57 However, the patent holder must be paid
51 See id. art. 27 (a) and (b); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (3).
52See Kevin W. McCabe, The January 1999 Review of Article 27 of the TRIPS Agree-
ment: Diverging Views of Developed and Developing Countries Toward the Patentability of
Biotechnology, 6 1. INELL. PRop. L. 41,45 (1998).
53 See F.M. ScHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 5
(1977).
5 See Patricia L Carter, Federal Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in the United States and
Canada, 21 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 215, 240-45 (1999). Under challenge from U.S.
pharmaceutical companies, Canadian courts upheld the payment of a 4% royalty by generic
producers to the brand-name patent-holders.
55 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (a); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (10) (a).
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adequate remuneration, 5 and all decisions relating to the compulsory li-
cense must be subject to independent review. 59 Production under the com-
pulsory license must be for domestic consumption, not export.6°
Development Lag
The TRIPS accord also makes some concessions to the particular needs
of developing countries that lack the administrative infrastructure to imple-
ment a sophisticated pharmaceutical patent system. Developing country
Members of the WTO are granted a ten year transitional period to bring
domestic law into compliance with the requirements for product patent pro-
tections in TRIPS Article 65 (4). There is no transition period in NAFTA,
but Mexico has three years to make enforcement fully operational. 61 Fi-
nally, Article 66 of TRIPS calls upon developed country Members to pro-
vide incentives to locally-based enterprises for the purpose of encouraging
technology transfer to the least developed countries. This particular man-
date does not provide any specific requirements or objectives. There is no
similar exhortation in NAFTA.
Advocates for implementing a strong intellectual property regime in
developing countries often maintain that it is in the best interest of those
countries to adopt a high level of protection. This theory holds that patent
protection will encourage technologically sophisticated investment in poor
countries, leading to a diffusion of technology, if investors can be assured
that they can restrict employees from transferring this technology to other
employers. There is no reason to believe, however, that offering patent pro-
tection will encourage rights holders to "work the patent" in a particular
country, if the rights are sufficient to preserve a monopoly on the import
market, as is the case with both TRIPS and NAFTA.
62
III. CREATING CONDITIONS FOR COMPLIANCE
Although with both agreements, U.S. negotiators encountered resis-
tance to the protection of intellectual property in general, and in particular,
58 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (h); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (10) (h).
59 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (i)-(j); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (10) (i) and (j).
60 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31 (f); NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1709 (f). Incidental
export apparently would be tolerated, as the language states specifically that authorization
shall extend "predominantly" to the domestic market.61 NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex 1718.14.
62 A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperial-
ism," 29 V.ND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 450-52 (1996). Oddi argues persuasively that there
is no strong economic policy justification for the particular rules embodied within TRIPS,
especially the 20 years of patent protection and the mandatory inclusion of a broad area of
subject matter. The only rationale for this type of patent regime stems from an implicit
natural rights theory underpinning the position taken by the developed countries, particularly
U.S. negotiators.
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pharmaceutical patent protection, the NAFTA provisions were easier to ob-
tain both in negotiation and implementation. Undoubtedly, it is easier to
obtain at a regional or subregional level what may seem insurmountable at a
multilateral level. Chapter 17 provisions were negotiated in one year,
whereas TRIPS dragged on for six years, and was only finalized after the
NAFTA was already signed. Harmonization of patent rules under NAFTA
was essentially accomplished as part of the negotiation and ratification pro-
cess. The TRIPS implementation process, on the other hand, involving
more gradual phase-in of patent protections, has generated more disputes.
A. Negotiation
NAFTA
The bilateral Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement ("FTA"),
63
was the precursor to NAFTA. Of special concern to the U.S. FTA negotia-
tors was Canada's 1969 patent law that contained provisions for the liberal
use of compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals at any time during the pat-
ent, and only protected processes, not products.64 Although a draft of that
agreement included specific intellectual property provisions, during the ne-
gotiation process, Canada obligingly passed a revised Patent Act that de-
ferred the authority to issue a compulsory license on imported
pharmaceuticals for seven to ten years.65 The Canadian reform was par-
tially motivated by the concern that lax protection of pharmaceutical intel-
lectual property was discouraging international investment in research and
development of new medicines. U.S. pharmaceutical companies offered to
increase investment in Canadian medical research in exchange for greater
patent protection.66 The final version of the FTA only contained a com-
mitment to future efforts at creating an intellectual property agreement. 67
As a result of the NAFTA negotiations, the Canadian Parliament once again
reformed its pharmaceutical patent law, bringing it closer in conformity to
the U.S. scheme.68
63 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 22, 1987,27 IL.M. 281 (1988).
64 For a detailed history of the pre-NAFTA Canadian drug patent regime, see John W.
Rogers II, The Revised Canadian Patent Act, the Free Trade Agreement, and Pharmaceuti-
cal Patents: An Overview of Pharmaceutical Compulsory Licensing in Canada, 10 EuR.
INTELL. PRop. RFv. 351 (1990).65 See id. at 356 (citing Bill C-22, of the 33d parliament, 2d Sess., 35-36 Eliz. 11 (1986 to
1987)).66 See Carter, supra note 54, at 241-42.
67See Rogers, supra note 64, at 353, n.31. Article 2004 of the FTA states: "the parties
shall cooperate in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations and in other interna-
tional forums to improve the protection of intellectual property." Id.
6 See Carter, supra note 54, at 243, (citing An Act to Amend the Patent Act, S.C., ch. 2,
§ 3 (1993); Patent Act, R.S.C., ch. P4, § 39 (1997) ("Bill C-91"). The new lav eliminated
the compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals and extended patent protection of pharmaceuti-
cals from 17 to 20 years.
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Mexico also passed legislation to bring patent protection in compliance
with NAFTA in anticipation of its signing.69 Patent protection was ex-
tended to both pharmaceutical products (previously unprotected) and proc-
esses. Subsequently published regulations clarified the limited use of
compulsory licenses for failures to work the patent (whether through local
manufacture or importation). A compulsory license can be requested when
the patent holder has not executed the exploitation of the patented product 7°
or process after three years from the issue of the patent or four from the ap-
plication filing date. Additionally, public utility licenses may be granted for
emergency causes or national security, as long as the license does not raise
prices or hinder production or distribution of basic needs goods.7' To date,
no compulsory license has been granted.
Both Mexico and Canada are now compliant, but U.S. pharmaceutical
companies are concerned about the use of price controls (which are legal
under both NAFTA and TRIPS), Mexico's failure to expressly prohibit par-
allel imports (also legal under the agreements), and mandated generic pre-
scribing, which the industry claims infringes trademark protections.7
TRIPS
Intellectual property was first introduced into multilateral trade nego-
tiations by the United States at the opening of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT at Punta del Este in 1986. In response to growing insistence by de-
veloped countries to include intellectual property within the GATT, a group
of developing countries led by Brazil and India offered a draft intellectual
property agreement that proposed obligations consistent with the then-
current practice in the developing world with respect to patents73 However,
it was the draft put forth by the United States, the European Economic
Community, and Switzerland that largely outlined the terms eventually
adopted.74 After a period of impasse, the developing countries (with the
strong exception of India) began to shift toward accepting the northern
69 See Ley de Propiedad Industrial, D.O., 27 de junio de 1991, amended by D.O., 2 de
agosto de 1994.70See Reglamento de la ley de Propiedad Industrial, D.O. art. 50-52 (Nov. 23, 1994),
also available at 2G WORLD PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 165 (2000).
71 See id.
7 See PhRMA, Issues & Policy Watch: Mexico, at http://www.phrma.org/issues/nte/me
xico.html (Sept. 26, 1999) (photocopy on file with author); see also PhRMA, Issues & Pol-
icy Watch: Canada, at http://www.phrma.org/issuesnte/canada.html (Sept. 26, 1999) (pho-
tocopy on file with author).
73 The prevailing view at the outset of negotiations considered the creation of maximum,
rather than minimum, standards to limit the degree that countries could implement protec-
tionist policies. See Reicnan, supra note 9, at 24.
74 See Roy Maclaren, The Geo-Political Changes During the 19809s and Their Influence
on the GATT, in THE URUGUAY RouNDt AND BEY OND, supra note 10, at 44.
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countries' scheme. 75 The successful adoption of TRIPS resulted from sev-
eral factors. First, developing countries obtained concessions on textiles,
clothing, and some agricultural products in exchange for agreeing to higher
levels of intellectual property protection. 76 Second, changing geopolitical
realities, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, softened resistance to intellec-
tual property protection.77
Most importantly, bilateral pressures made acceptance of the devel-
oped countries' intellectual property agenda a necessity for some.78 For ex-
ample, the United States threatened unilateral trade sanctions under §301 of
the U.S. trade law79 in retaliation against Brazil for its failure to protect
pharmaceutical products and processes.8° A spokesperson for the Pharma-
ceutical Manufactures Association ("PMA"), the complainant that brought
the charge to the U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR"), stated that Brazil is
the "global leader in its opposition to patent protection [for pharmaceuti-
cals.] We hope the imposition of this sanction... will impress upon Brazil
the seriousness with which the United States views the unauthorized appro-
priation of its citizens' intellectual property."8  Despite U.S. resistance,
Brazil sought the establishment of a GATT panel to investigate whether the
100% tariff on a basket of Brazilian exports, including paper products and
consumer electronics, was legal within the then-established GATT.12 Al-
though the Brazilian case was strongly supported within the GATT mem-
bership, it was abandoned in the face of the influence of U.S. market
strength. The punitive tariffs were terminated after the Brazilian President
announced the introduction of legislation to provide patent protection for
pharmaceuticals.83
Finally, some compromises to developing country concerns were in-
cluded in the final draft. These included the exclusion of patents on life
7' See id.
76 See generally MULTILATERALISM AND REGIONALISM AF=ER THE URUGUAY ROUND, su-
pra note 10.
77 See Roy Maclaren, The Geo-Political Changes During the 19809s and Their Influence
on the GA77, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND, supra note 10, at 44.
78See id. at 45.
71 See Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West Supp. 2000). Section 301 au-
thorizes the U.S. Administration to take action against any foreign country practices it de-
termines to be discriminatory or restrictive of U.S. commerce.
80 See Reagan, Charging Patent Piracy, Imposes Sanctions on $39 Million of Brazilian
Goods, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1415 (Oct. 26, 1988).8 1 Id.
8 GATT art. XXIII. GATT panels were the precursor to the current and more binding
WTO dispute settlement body. Because panels could be blocked and consensus was required
for the adoption of decisions, countries enjoyed essential veto power over the establishment
of panels and adoption of results. See the discussion of dispute settlement, infra, for further
information.83 See Determination to Terminate Increased Duties on Certain Articles From Brazil, 55
Fed. Reg. 27,324 (Jul. 2, 1990).
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forms, the ten-year transition period for developing countries, and the al-
lowance of compulsory licensing, albeit with stringent restrictions.
B. Dispute Settlement
Although in their substantive provisions, the regional and multilateral
trade regimes largely converge, resolution of disputes covered within the
agreements differ in several respects. NAFTA Chapter 17 and TRIPS both
rely fundamentally on domestic regimes to enforce the substantive and pro-
cedural laws each country has established to implement the agreements.
However, if a Member (or Party) fails to meet an intellectual property obli-
gation, intergovernmental dispute resolution procedures can be pursued.
Chapter 20 of NAFTA and the Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU")
of the WTO15 both establish permanent administrative bodies to manage
disputes86 and consultation procedures to promote settlement.87 Failing set-
tlement, countries may request the 
establishment of arbitration panels.f
s
Under the WTO DSU, panels are empowered to render enforceable de-
cisions. Appeals can be made to a standing Appellate Body.8 9 Claims for
breach of intellectual property obligations can be remedied by injunctions,
monetary damages, or forfeiture of infringing goods or some form of mutu-
ally acceptable compensation. Cross-sectoral retaliation in the form of pu-
nitive tariffs are available where a country does not comply with panel
decisions. Non-violation complaints arising from TRIPS were given a
moratorium until January 1, 2000.90
Panel decisions under NAFTA Chapter 20 are not binding. Parties are
called upon to reach a resolution consistent with the panel report, involving
termination of the NAFTA-illegal conduct or appropriate compensation.
84 See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 27-3(b), 65-4, and 31.
85 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 2.
86 The two bodies are the NAFTA Secretariat and Free Trade Commission and the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB").
87 Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 2, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: The Legal Texts 404 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1226, Art. 4 (1994) [hereinafter
DSU]; NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2006.88 NAFTA allows for disputes that arise under either the regional or multilateral agree-
ment to be brought in either forum, but where there is disagreement among the Parties,
NAFTA will be the preferred forum. See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2005.
89 DSU Article 17-14 states: "An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the [DSB]
and unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consen-
sus not to adopt the Appellate Body report .... "
90 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 65. Non-violation complaints, or complaints alleging
nullification or impairment of benefits, refer to measures that are not facially inconsistent
with the TRIPS obligations, but have the effect of undermining them.
91 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2018.
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However, suspension of benefits against a nonconforming Party is allowed
if an agreement cannot be reached within thirty days of a panel report. 2
Investor-Government arbitration
An interesting, if little-noticed, feature of the NAFTA dispute resolu-
tion armature is Chapter 11, which provides for the private enforcement of
investment rights where a NAFTA Party is in breach of the substantive
standards for the treatment of foreign investment. Unlike the government-
to-government dispute resolution regime outlined in Chapter 20, this alter-
native dispute settlement mechanism involves investor-state arbitration.
Thus, if an individual investor is unable or unwilling to obtain diplomatic
action from his or her government, the investor may opt to initiate arbitra-
tion proceedings against the offending government. Additionally, investors
may choose Chapter 11 arbitration as an alternative to seeking domestic
remedies.
Tribunals are limited to awarding monetary damages; relief in the form
of overturning judgments or administrative or legislative actions is not
available. An investor seeking relief for a host government action may
choose between the World Bank's International Center for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes ("ICSID"); ICSID's Additional Facility Rules93; and
the rules of the United Nations Commission for the International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL" rules.) There is no judicial review of arbitral tribunals.
Proceedings are closed, and there is no publication of decisions or proceed-
ings without consent of both parties. Thus, it is somewhat difficult to ob-
tain information on the nature and outcome of these proceedings. Thus far,
there have been only a limited number of arbitrations under Chapter 11.94
In one recent case, the threat of bringing an investor action through Chapter
11 was sufficient to persuade the Canadian government to revoke a ban on
the importation and trade of a gasoline additive and to settle with the U.S.
producer.95
92 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2019.
93 Neither Canada nor Mexico are parties to the ICSID Convention, but have agreed to
handle disputes through the additional facility. See generally LEON E. TRAKMAN, DIspuTE
SETTLENIENT UNDER NAFTA 44-45 (1997).
94 There ,vere only five arbitrations pending in April 2000. See List of Pending Cases,
(Apr. 2000), available at http://vvv.worldbank'org/icsid/cases/pending.htm.95See Canadian Government Withdraws MMT Ban; Ethyl Drops Suit in Exchange For
$13 Million, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1280 (Jul. 22, 1998). Ethyl, the sole North Ameri-
can producer of the substance, alleged that political, not environmental, regulatory motiva-
tion was behind the ban. The Canadian government also faced suits from several provinces
alleging that the ban illegally restricted interprovincial trade.
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The definition of an "investment" that falls within Chapter 11 includes
intellectual property.96 In effect, Chapter 11 provides for compensation of
foreign investors in the event of a "regulatory taking" in the host country.97
Under the provisions covering expropriation and compensation, a Party that
has failed to protect intellectual property rights in accordance with Chapter
17 can be subject to arbitration." An arbitral judgment of the fair market
value of the lost investment and associated costs can be awarded to the ag-
grieved investor.99 There is no analogous facility within the WTO, where
all claims are of an intergovernmental nature. However, similar investor
protections have been considered within the proposed Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment ("MAI").'0°
Cases
To date, there have been no actions within the NAFTA dispute frame-
work regarding pharmaceuticals. The WTO, however, has become the lo-
cus of pharmaceutical patent protection controversies, several of which are
relevant to an emerging WTO case law of interest to developing countries
seeking to devise a TRIPS-compliant essential drugs policy. The provision
for pipeline protection to pharmaceuticals (and agricultural chemicals) in
countries that had not yet instituted a patent system was, understandably,
the first issue to generate disputes. The United States brought a complaint
against India for failing to provide "mailbox" priority filing for foreign
holders of pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical patents as required by
TRIPS Art. 70 (8), and for not providing the exclusive marketing rights
mandated by Art. 79 (9). 1 1 The Panel found for the United States, and the
Appellate Body upheld the decision, ordering India to bring its laws into
96 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139(g): "real estate or other property, tangible or in-
tangible, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other
business purposes."97 NAFTA, supra note 1, art 1110-1 provides: "no Party may directly or indirectly na-
tionalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a
measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment .... "98 However, the Agreement explicitly states that '"tis Article does not apply to the issu-
ance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or the revoca-
tion, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance,
revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen." NAFTA, supra
note 1, art. 1110-7.
99Seeid. art. 1110-2.
100 See generally PETER S. WATSON ET AL., COMPLETING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:
PROPOSALS FOR THE MILLENNIum ROUND 249-57 (1999). Negotiations within the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") came to an end in December
1998 without a draft agreement, but the possibility of resumption was left open.
'01 See WTO, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DD50/4 (Nov. 8, 1996).
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compliance. 0 2 India argued that it had complied with the pipeline and ex-
clusive marketing provisions but that it had done so through an administra-
tive act, rather than through legislation. In reviewing the Indian domestic
legal system, the Appellate Body concluded that the administrative proce-
dures would not withstand legal challenge, as they were inconsistent with
India's Patent Act.103
The Indian government had not been able to pass TRIPS-consistent
legislation through Parliament and had attempted to substitute an adminis-
trative act for the democratic process."04 Given its well-developed generic
medicines industry and the resulting availability of cheap medicines, resis-
tance to introduction of TRIPS-level patent protection within India remains
strong. In 1999, India enacted permanent legislation establishing "mailbox"
filing procedures in compliance with the Appellate Body mandate.'05 Al-
though refraining from taking further action, the United States expressed
disappointment that the exclusive marketing provisions included some ex-
ceptions, such as the discretionary use of compulsory licensing.10 6
In May 1999, the United States requested formal consultations with
Argentina pursuant to WTO rules, alleging that Argentina also had failed to
implement the pipeline and exclusive marketing provisions. The United
States simultaneously sought consultations about a grandfather provision in
Canada's revised patent law. Patent applications filed before Oct. 1, 1989
run 17 years from the date issued, rather than the 20 required under Article
33 of TRIPS.
107
In February of 1999, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO estab-
lished a panel to examine Canada's pharmaceutical patent regime at the re-
quest of the European Union.'0 8 Canada's Bill C-91, passed in conjunction
with the NAFTA, allows generic producers of patented pharmaceuticals to
carry out experiments required for marketing approval, and for the manu-
facture and stockpiling of patented products six months before the patent
See WTO, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997), available at
http://www.vto.org/english/tratope/dispu_e/7428d.doc.
1
03 See Watson et aI., supra note 100, at 34 (noting the legal significance of the Appellate
Body's close examination of the domestic legal system to determine compliance).
104 See generally Roy Maclaren, The Geo-Political Changes During the 19809s and Their
Influence on the GATT, in Tim URUGUAY ROUND AND BEYOND, supra note 10.
10 See India Complies With WFTO Ruling on TRTPs, FiN. Tmms, Mar. 11, 1999, available
at http:/vwwv.newsbulletirnorg/bulletins/getbuetin.CFMS]D=#India (on file with the
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business).
106 See Special 301 Annual Review, supra note 7.
107 See US. Requests Consultations at WTO on Argentine, Canadian Patent Protection,
16 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 820 (Dec. 5, 1999).
108 See WTO, Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities,
WT/DS 114/5 (Nov. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Request for the Establishment of a Panel]; see
also W/TO New Item: 1999 News Item, at http://vwv.wto.org/english/news_elnews99_e/l 1
4_5.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2001).
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expiration without the approval of the patent holder.10 9 By encouraging the
market availability of generic products as soon as patents expire, the Cana-
dian policy sought to strike a balance between the requirements of patent
protection and the social need of access to pharmaceuticals at an affordable
price."0 The European Union alleged that this provision violated the
TRIPS requirements prohibiting unauthorized third parties from making or
using the protected good within the 20-year patent period."'
The WTO panel decision allowed for the Canadian "regulatory review"
exception to patent exclusivity as consistent with the established practice of
permitting use of patented substances for experimental purposes. However,
the panel found that the stockpiling of patented pharmaceuticals prior to
patent expiration did not fall within any of the TRIPS Article 30 "limited
exceptions." Even though the Canadian law prohibited introduction into the
market until the patent expiration date, manufacture for future commercial
sale constituted a competitive commercial activity that substantially cur-
tailed the patent holders' exclusive rights to make and use, and was there-
fore in violation of Article 28.1 of TRIPS." 2 Although it is a "first world"
controversy, the outcome will impact the future policy of developing world
countries, such as South Africa, India, Argentina and Brazil, that have a so-
phisticated pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity."
3
If this last claim had been brought by a U.S.-based international phar-
maceutical company, the enterprise itself could take action under NAFTA
Chapter 11 investor-state arbitration rules, rather than seek diplomatic rep-
resentation. Although relief would be limited to monetary damages for the
presumed loss related to the "head start" afforded generic producers in the
Canadian system, an arbitral award in favor of the pharmaceutical company
could have the effect of chilling the application of those provisions.
C. The Limits of Compromise?
Although the United States successfully negotiated strong rights for the
multinational pharmaceutical industry within the regional and multilateral
trade agreements, it has continued to push the full agenda not achieved at
' 09 The United States instituted similar provisions (called 'Bolar" exemptions) under the
1984 Waxman-Hatch legislation, which allows generic competitors to manufacture small
amounts of a product still under patent for testing purposes. See Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 35 U.S.C.A. § 156 (West 2000).
110 See WTO, Report of the Appellate Body: WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada,
WT/DSI 14/R (Mar. 17, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/English/lratop__!e/dispu__e/74
28d.doc [hereinafter W1TO Dispute Panel Report].
"' See TRIPS, supra note 2, arts. 28-1(a) and 33; see also Request for the Establishment
of a Panel, supra note 108.
'12 See WTO Dispute Panel Report, supra note 110.
113 Although there is no formal precedential effect of WTO decisions, individual case
outcomes are widely viewed as having persuasive authority.
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those negotiations through bilateral relations.114 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)
defines as "unreasonable" any "act, policy, or practice ... which (i) denies
fair and equitable (ii) provision of adequate and effective protection of in-
tellectual property rights notwithstanding the fact that the foreign country
may be in compliance vith the specific obligations of the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights . . ." The weapon of
§ 301 sanctions against countries engaged in discriminatory trade practices
was augmented by the introduction of "Special 301" in 1988. Under Spe-
cial 301 provisions, the USTR is required to prepare a list of "priority" for-
eign countries that are considered the worst offenders of intellectual
property rights. The USTR then enters into negotiations with these coun-
tries under the threat of sanctions. Less severe offenders are placed on
"priority watch" and "watch" lists to notify them that their level of intellec-
tual property protections are not satisfactory to the United States.
1 15
In the wake of U.S. unilateral retaliation against the European Union
during the pendency of a WTO dispute panel adjudication,116 the European
Union brought a complaint alleging that the unilateral actions established in
U.S. trade laws, §§ 301-310, do not comply with the WTO.'1 7 Although the
complaint centered on the timing of actions mandated under § 304, the re-
port of the panel applies to actions taken with respect to intellectual prop-
erty under § 310. Following the Appellate Body's India patent case ruling
that examination of municipal law is an appropriate inquiry, the panel none-
theless came to the opposite outcome in this case. The report notes that the
U.S. statute is facially inconsistent with article 23 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. It then goes on to analyze how this facial inconsistency is
cured by representations made to the Dispute Settlement Body by the
United States indicating that it has no intention of implementing the broad
discretion in the legislation in a VTO-inconsistent manner."" Thus, a
1
4 See Special 301 Annual Review, supra note 7 (noting that Special 301 was amended
with the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements "to clarify that a country can be
found to deny adequate and effective intellectual property protection even if it is in compli-
ance with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement").
"' See, e.g., USTR Initiates WTO Consultations on IPR with Argentina, Canada, EU, 16
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 763 (May 5, 1999).
1
6 See European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas-Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the
DSU, WT/DS27/ARB (April 9, 1999), available at http://wwwv.wto.org/english/tratope/disp
ue/distab e.htm.
117 See TFIO Dispute Panel Report on U.S. - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974,
WT/DSl 52/R (December 22, 1999), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/gen_search.asp.
t' See id. 7.117 - 7.131. Paragraph 7.125 states:
We find that these statements by the [United States] express the unambiguous and
official position of the [United States] representing, in a manner that can be relied
upon by all Members, an undertaking that the discretion of the USTR has been lim-
ited so as to prevent a determination of inconsistency before exhaustion of DSU
proceedings.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:379 (2001)
clearly WTO-illegal law may remain on the books as long as it is not en-
forced. This allowance lets the USTR continue to exercise its mandate un-
der the legislation to conduct investigations and publish "watch lists" of
offending countries, as long as it takes no action without first exhausting the
WTO dispute settlement process. From the perspective of developing coun-
tries that frequently are the targets of pressure exerted "softly" through such
threats, this limitation may be very cold comfort. The bilateral exercises in
South Africa and Thailand, briefly described below, indicate the scope of
the potential chilling effect that such action can have.
South Africa
The human tragedy of the global AIDS epidemic often has been com-
pared to the 14th century plague in Europe. Of the estimated 33.4 million
HIV-infected individuals around the world, about two thirds live in sub-
Saharan Africa. Currently, between 20% to 26% of the population in some
southern African countries is infected." 9 One in eight South Africans is
HIV positive. Yet, the cost of HIV drugs is prohibitive to most Africans.'20
In 1997, South Africa enacted legislation designed to give the Minister
of Health discretion to ensure the affordable supply of medicine.12' The law
allows the Minister to abrogate patent rights for exclusive marketing of a
particular medicine (compulsory licensing). 122 Additionally, the Minister
may license the right to import a substance registered in South Africa so
that the drug can be imported from any other country where it is manufac-
tured (parallel importing),'2 3 The Medicines Act also contained a number
ld. at 17.125.
19 See David Satcher, The Global HIVIAIDS Epidemic, 281 J.A.M.A., No. 16 (Apr. 28,
1999), at http:I/jama.ama-assn.orglissuesfv28lnl6/ful/jsg9lOOl-l.html.
120 Combination anti-retroviral therapy costs about USD 12,000 in South Africa.
121 See § 15C of Medicines and Related Substances Control Act of 1965 (as amended
1997), JSRSA 1997 vol. 3 at 1-63 [hereinafter Medicines Act].
122 The Medicines Act states:
The Minister may prescribe conditions for the supply of more affordable medi-
cines in certain circumstances so as to protect the health of the public, and in par-
ticular may... determine that the rights with regard to any medicine under a patent
granted in the Republic shall not extend to acts in respect of such medicine which
has been put onto the market by the owner of the medicine, or with his or her con-
sent.
Id. at 1-64.
123 The Medicines Act, Section 15C (b), allows the Minister to
prescribe the conditions on which any medicine [thati is identical in composition,
meets the same quality standard and is intended to have the same proprietary name as
that of another medicine already registered in the Republic, but [that] is imported by a
person other than the person who is the holder of the registration certificate of the
medicine already registered and [that] originates from any site of manufacture of the
original manufacturer as approved by the council in the prescribed manner, may be
imported.
400
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of other provisions aimed at reducing medicine costs and assuring quality.
These provisions prompted a political storm initiated by the multinational
research pharmaceutical industry concerned about the global effect that
South Africa's actions would have on securing patent rights to pharmaceu-
ticals.124
There is little doubt that a country such as South Africa can legally ad-
dress the AIDS crisis by invoking its TRIPS authority to grant compulsory
licenses for the importation or local manufacture of essential drugs.'2' In-
deed, as discussed above, TRIPS does not prohibit the use of parallel im-
ports. Nonetheless, according to the South African Director General of
Health, parallel imports were to be strictly controlled: "[I]t has never been
the intention of the Department to allow for the unbridled importation of
drugs or the flooding of the market with unsafe products.', 126 The broad
wording of the statute, however, raises the question of whether the Medi-
cines Act adheres to the highly restrictive TRIPS approach to compulsory
licensing. In 1998 and 1999, the USTR placed South Africa on its "Watch
List", implicating the Medicines Act's "ill-defined authority to issue com-
pulsory licenses, authorize parallel imports and potentially otherwise abro-
gate patent rights.' '127 Maintaining that parallel imports are TRIPS-illegal,
the United States actively engaged in bilateral negotiations in an effort to
achieve the "repeal, termination or withdrawal" of Article 15C of the Medi-
cines Act.128 The diplomatic offensive included the suspension of four
items from receiving preferential tariff treatment under the Generalized
System of Preferences ("GSP").
129
1d.
124 See PhRMA, Issues & Policy: Priority Foreign Countries, South Africa--Intellectual
Property Protection, at http://www.phrma.org/issues/nte/safrica.html (Sept 26, 1999)
(photocopy on file with author). A group of 40 multinational pharmaceutical companies
brought suit in South Africa, challenging the constitutionality of the Medicines Act.
125 See TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 31. See the discussion of compulsory licensing, supra.
126 Olive Shisana, New Medicines Bill Will Benefit Consumers, at http://www.polity.org.
za/govdocs/pr/1997/prO821ahtnil (Aug. 21, 1997). Dr. Shisana served as the Director Gen-
eral of Health for South Africa.
127 Special 301 Annual Review, supra note 7. Among South Africa's offenses was lead-
ership of "a faction of nations in the WHO... calling for a reduction in the level of protec-
tion provided for pharmaceuticals in TRIPS." Id.
128 See U.S. Government Efforts to Negotiate the Repeal, Termination or Withdrawal of
Article 15C of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Act of 1965 (Dep't of
State Feb. 5, 1999) [hereinafter U.S. Government Efforts], available at http:fl
vww.cptech.orglip/health/sa/stdept-feb51999.html. This action was required by the Oni-
bus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 (Pub. L. No.
105-277).
29 See U.S. Government Efforts, supra note 128. The GSP is a GATT exception to the
most-favored-nation rule that allows developed countries to extend tariff reductions on a bi-
lateral basis to developing countries.
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An explosion of publicity generated by AIDS activists in the United
States ensued, and the U.S. government backed off its more aggressive
stance.1 30 The two countries reached an understanding. The United States
recognized South Africa's urgent need for more affordable health care in
the context of the AIDS epidemic, and it pledged an end to the issue and
restoration of GSP privileges in exchange for assurances that in implement-
ing its health policy, South Africa would comply with TRIPS.
13'
Thailand
Thailand also has been hard-hit by AIDS, where only 5% of the esti-
mated one million HIV-infected individuals can afford the two-drug anti-
retroviral regime prescribed to them.1 32 The cost of triple therapy is USD
675 a month, whereas the average monthly wage of an office worker is
USD120.33 With an active generic industry, and limited protection of ex-
clusive marketing rights, Thailand successfully has reduced the prices of
some drugs. When the antifungal fluconazole lost its exclusive marketing
rights, competition from three local producers reduced the price by 95%.
4
Thailand's Government Pharmaceutical Organization ("GPO") has been
producing generic AZT for a quarter of the price of the brand name version
for several years. 35 The government has balked, however, at activist pres-
sure to grant a compulsory license for the drug didanosine ("ddi"), owned
by Bristol-Myers-Squibb. If the Thai Public Health Minister had authorized
the compulsory license, it would have been the first instance of compulsory
licensing under Article 31 of TRIPS, but the looming trade pressure was
sufficient to forestall the issuing of a compulsory license. 36 Because one
quarter of Thailand's exports are directed to the United States, the threat of
trade sanctions has powerful influence. 37  Not surprisingly, Thailand's
130 See, e.g., Charles R. Babcock, AIDS Activists Dog Gore a 2 "d Day, WASH. POST, June
18, 1999, at A12. Activists targeted campaigning Vice President Gore, who was involved in
negotiations through leadership of the U.S.-South Africa Binational Commission.
13 See Press Release, USTR, U.S.-South Afica Understanding on Intellectual Property,
(Sept. 19, 1999), available at http://www.ustr.gov/releases1999/09/99-76.html.
132 See Sutin Wannabovorn, Thais Protest U.S. Firm's AIDS Drug Monopoly, at
http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/991222/bq/html (Dec. 22, 1999) (photocopy on file with author).
Thailand has a population of 61 million.
133 See Global Trade and Access to Medicines: AIDS Treatments in Thailand, 354
LANCET 1893, 1894 Nov. 27, 1999 [hereinafter Global Trade and Access to Medicines].
134 See id. Fluconazole treats cryptococcal meningitis, an opportunistic infection that
strikes one in five AIDS patients in Thailand.
135 See Wannabovorn, supra note 132.
.36 See Aphaluck Bhatiasevi, Korn Refers Drug Call to Council of State - Activists Say
Fears of Backlash Unfounded, BANGKOK POST, December 25, 1999 (photocopy on file with
author).
137 See Global Trade andAccess to Medicines, supra note 133.
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weak enforcement of patents has landed it on the Special 301 Priority and
Priority Watch Lists in the past.
1 38
Although the Thai government backed away from issuing a compul-
sory license in the ddi case, mounting pressure, both from within develop-
ing countries and from international organizations, such as Medecins Sans
Fronti~res, triggered a compromise gesture from the industry. Five multi-
national pharmaceutical companies (Germany's Boehringen Ingelheim,
U.S.-based Bristol-Myers Squibb and Merck, Glaxo Wellcome of the
United Kingdom, and Hoffrman-La Roche of Switzerland) agreed to provide
AIDS treatments at reduced rates to developing countries through the
United Nations as part of a broader initiative to improve treatment access.1
39
Treatment advocates are skeptical about this foreign aid approach to solving
the affordability crisis. The use of compulsory licenses would allow coun-
tries to have more sustainable control over the availability of medicines,
rather than relying on patented drugs produced by multinational manufac-
turers, which will continue to be more expensive.
Truce
On December 1, 1999 (World AIDS Day) in the midst of the highly
contentious Seattle WTO Ministerial meeting, President Clinton announced
that the U.S. trade policy would consider poor countries' need for lifesaving
drugs, and would no longer oppose compulsory licensing or parallel import-
ing where there exists a "healthcare emergency, particularly in respect of
[sic] HIV-AIDS.,', 41 Countries may review particular medicines on a case-
by-case basis, and where there is a determination of emergent need, they
may grant a compulsory license after negotiating with the patent-holder.
The statement represents a retreat in U.S. policy to TRIPS/NAFTA level
protections of intellectual property. 42 However, clear standards are yet to
138 See, e.g., USTR Reviews Whether to Restore Thailand's GSP Benefits Lost in 1989, 11
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1176 (1994).
139 See New Public/Private Sector Effort Initiated to Accelerate Access to HIV/AIDS Care
and Treatment in Developing Countries (May 11, 2000) at http://www.unaids.orglwhatsnewl
pressfeng/pressarcO0/geneval 10500.html.
"4o See, e.g., Kelvin Ng, Rights-Thailand: Struggling to [...] HIV Drugs Cheaper, Inter-
press Service (June 26, 2000), at http:/vww.oneworlctorg/ips2/juneOO13_20_037.html.
'4 1 Frances Williams, US. to Consider Poor Countries' Need for Drugs, Fin. TviMns
(London), Dec. 3, 1999, at 6.
142At the request of Health Gap Coalition, a U.S.-based international AIDS activist
group, the USTR sent a letter, which was later copied to the Thai government, to the head of
a Thai non-governmental organization stating the U.S. commitment that the "application of
U.S. trade law related to intellectual property remains sufficiently flexible to respond to pub-
lic health crises." The letter further stated that "[i]f the Thai government determines that is-
suing a compulsory license is required to address its health care crisis, the United States will
raise no objection, provided the compulsory license is issued in a manner fully consistent
with the WTO Agreement on TRIPS. Letter from Joseph S. Papovich, Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative for Services, Investment and Intellectual Property, to Mr. Paisan Tan-Ud,
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be articulated. In granting compulsory licenses, local officials must be will-
ing to "test" the United States and respond to legal challenges at the domes-
tic and international level, as well as to the threat of unilateral sanctions.
Governments are walking a tightrope between pressing health needs, in-
creasing pressures from domestic constituencies and the cost of challenging
international pharmaceutical interests. As a political matter, the Clinton
announcement in Seattle illustrates the importance of maintaining support
from transnational groups that can counter the political pressure exercised
by pharmaceutical companies.' 43
Adjudicating compulsory licensing and unilateral responses before the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body is problematic. Despite the relative expedi-
ency of the process, parties may wait a year or more for a determination.
Worse, the adjudication process would place the WTO dispute panel in the
politically unsavory position of evaluating whether a true "health emer-
gency" existed, and whether the country in question engaged in sufficient
negotiations with the license holder.14
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
As a strategy for promoting investment in the essential drug needs of
the developing world, universal intellectual property protection hardly is
optimal. Diseases suffered by populations with no purchasing power are
not going to be addressed by commercial producers. In fact, treatments for
some tropical diseases have begun to disappear from the market due to lack
of effective demand, despite significant need.145 Of the over 1,200 new
drugs commercialized between 1975 and 1997, 30% are considered thera-
peutic innovations, but only 1% are specifically for tropical diseases.146 - Of
these, only four may be considered the direct product of research and de-
velopment activity in the pharmaceutical industry (the rest came out of vet-
erinary research or military research or were updated versions of existing
Chairman of PHA Network of Thailand, (Jan. 27,2000), available at http://www.cptech.org/
ip/health/c/tbailand/ustrlettejan27.htrnl.
' 43 See Sabin Russell, World Trade Showdown; Activists, Industry Split Over AIDS
Drugs, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1999, atAl (describing the role of James Love, director of the
Consumer Project on Technology, and other health and activist organizations in placing the
issue before the U.S. public and on the international agenda). In January of 2000, Vice
President (and then-Presidential candidate) Albert Gore brought the issue of the international
AIDS crisis before the United Nations Security Council in an unprecedented gesture toward
raising a health issue to the level of an international security concern.
'" See generally Dreyfuss and Lowenfeld, supra note 31 (describing the difficulties of
using the dispute settlement mechanism for inquiring into government decisions "at the bor-
ders" of the TRIPS agreement).
145 See Bernard Pecoul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries, A Lost Bat-
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products.) 147 AIDS is anomalous in that drugs were developed for use in
the North, even though the vast majority of sufferers live in developing
countries.
From Conflict to Cooperation
Efforts to create viable markets have been undertaken by collabora-
tions among public, nonprofit, and private entities. For example, WHO to-
gether with foundations and nonprofit organizations recently announced an
effort to raise at least $500 million to halt the spread of drug-resistant tuber-
culosis.14 Buttressing purchasing power, however, only partially will
address the issue of inaccessible pricing. Public or nonprofit initiatives also
must increase funding flows for research in essential areas,' 49 and also can
consider opportunities to act within the market as intellectual property
rights holders. Rather than conceive of intellectual property as only a zero
sum game between assuring return on investment or facilitating widespread
access, creative uses of this valuable asset can be deployed.1 50
A pioneering example of this approach is the International AIDS Vac-
cine Initiative ("IAVI"), a nonprofit group that has funded AIDS vaccine
development in the academy and the private sector. Funding recipients
agree to allow the nonprofit to file patents for discoveries where investiga-
tors choose not to do so. Otherwise, IAVI retains flexible rights to the
intellectual property. The licensing agreements stipulate, for example, that
price must be kept at no more than 10% of production costs.'
Socializing the Risk in Research
147 See id.
'4 See Judith Miller, In Fight Against Tuberculosis, Experts Look for Private Help, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1999, atA8.
149 The recently launched "Medicines for Malaria Venture" involves a partnership among
international pharmaceutical companies, WHO, the World Bank, government agencies, and
the Rockefeller Foundation to engage in drug discovery and development for malaria. See
Elizabeth Olson, Drug Groups and UN. Offices Join to Develop Malaria Cures, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1999, atA5.
0 See J.H. Reichman and David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: The
Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property
Transactions, 9 DuKE J. CohM. & INT'L L. 11 (1998). Reichman and Lange discuss TRIPS
as a non-cooperative enterprise. Because developing countries will have difficulty imple-
menting the high standards as a result of the unacceptably high social costs, the authors ad-
vocate using the agreement as a set of "default rules" around which governments and private
investors can negotiate transactions on a case-by-case basis. Applying this theory in the
copyright field, the authors view this kind of private "deal-making" as a way to increase in-
vestment in developing countries.
151 IAVI maintains options to make use of the intellectual property rights to produce a
vaccine for the developing world under certain circumstances. See Press Release, IAVI,
Two Innovative AIDS Vaccine Development Partnerships Launched (Nov. 26, 1998).
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Although these nascent strategies are far from commonplace, they
point toward a conscious role for government, nonprofits, and philanthro-
pists to rethink policy and strategically view themselves as economic actors
in the market to obtain social goals. Progress in this area may evolve more
readily from the nonprofit sector than from governments, as it is more
flexible, independent, and can act on transnational interests that do not have
formal access to national and international public fora. Nonprofits involved
in medical research and international health promotion can take a proactive
stance within the market and within the policy community based on a stra-
tegic assessment of the current status of the pharmaceutical industry and the
third sector's (and public sector's) involvement as economic actors. The
industry has undergone dramatic change in the last decade. Research and
marketing costs are rising at the same time that an explosion of new tech-
nology, such as the emergence of biotechnology, and the ability to screen
candidate substances at an accelerated rate are fundamentally changing the
nature of pharmaceutical research and development. Large pharmaceutical
companies increasingly are merging in an effort to save duplication of ef-
forts in research and marketing, but it is in smaller research firms, often
spinning off of university laboratories, that the most innovative and cost ef-
ficient research is taking place.' 52 The latter often are research rich but cash
poor, and increasingly are licensing their technology to large pharmaceuti-
cal companies for development.
Estimates vary on the actual cost of developing a drug from discovery
to market.'53 Citing a 1997 study in Pharmacoeconomics, Pecoul et al. state
an average of $160 million over a period of 8 to 12 years. Industry repre-
sentatives claim that the amount is closer to $500 million in a 12 to 15 year
period. 154 Industry observers often point out that most large pharmaceutical
research companies spend twice as much on marketing than on research.155
This disparity can be partly attributed to an accounting problem related to
research and development. Money invested in research is a "sunk cost."
Much like overhead, the value generated from that investment will not be
realized for many years, but the expense must be recorded in the year it is
made, rather than capitalized over time.'56 At the moment, there is very lit-
152 See Addicted to Mergers?, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 6, 1999, at 8.
'53 See Danzon, supra note 25, at 5. Danzon estimated that average after-tax cost of drug
development in the United States in 1993 was $194 million, based on data from the Office of
Technology Assessment ("OTA"). Included in that figure was a 10% annual allowance for
forgone capital.
15 4 See PhRMA Policy Papers: Strong Patent Protection is Essential (Sept. 26, 1999), at
http://wvww.phnna.org/issues/protect.html (photocopy on file with author).
'55 See Addicted to Mergers?, supra note 152, at 88, showing expenditures in research
and development as 13% and marketing and sales as 29% of sales revenues.
156 Thus, given the time value of money, the actual expense/risk to the industry is higher
than income statements reflect See Danzon, supra note 25, at 5-8.
International Governance Through Trade Agreements
21:379 (2001)
tie clarity regarding the actual link between patent protection and innova-
tion in essential medicines.
James Love has pointed out that many of the breakthrough AIDS
medications (and other essential drugs) were developed through funding
from the U.S. National Institute for Health ("NIH") with public money, and
licensed to private industry for manufacturing and marketing. 57 A recent
New York Times report details the transformation in the research rewards
wrought by a 1980 law intended to spur commercialization of inventions. 58
The law permitted university researchers with public grants to license dis-
coveries to private companies for development. The result has produced a
high stakes search for "blockbuster" drugs in university laboratories, the
creation of commercial spin-offs from academic research, and a shift away
from exclusively basic research to later-stage drug development by aca-
demic researchers, leading many pharmaceutical companies to "outsource"
discovery and development efforts that previously had been conducted in-
house. Provisions in the law that allowed the government to intervene in
order to obtain the benefits of tax sponsored research free of royalties have
not been utilized; in fact, according to the General Accounting Office, the
Health Institutes have not tracked the flow of this investment and the result-
ing inventions. 15 9
V. CONCLUSION
Over the long-term, the pharmaceutical industry may be fragmenting
into research, development, and manufacturing and marketing functions.
This situation may provide significant opportunities for increased publicly
responsive control over the fruits of innovation. A general lack of transpar-
ent analysis on investment in research, the interaction of public and private
resources, and the role of university researchers in disseminating (or retain-
ing and commercializing) knowledge is a major obstacle to public discourse
on a truly rational pharmaceuticals policy. On the international plane, trade
agreements serve to obfuscate the problem by channeling resolution of con-
flicts through a regime of elaborately articulated property "rights."
Resolutions to the affordability conundrum are only part of a larger
public health challenge to the infectious disease crisis in the developing
world, or even the cancer and heart disease complaints of developed world.
However, the mechanisms for intellectual property protection established
through the trade agreements are ill-suited to overcome this dilemma. Not
157 For more discussion of this, see documents at http://www.cpteck-org, especially the
letter from Ralph Nader, James Love, and Robert Weissman to Dr. Harold Varmus, Director
of NIH, asking for NIH to give the WHO access to U.S. government-funded medical inven-
tions (Sept. 3, 1999).
158 See Gerth and Stolberg, supra note 45 (discussing Public Law 96-517, the Bayh-Dole
Act, 35 U.S.C. 200 etseq.).
159 See id.
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only do they operate in an incongruous context, they also are not reflective
of the actual nature of the transnational interests affected by policy out-
comes. While the fights of intellectual property holders are enshrined at the
international level, the balancing of public health and consumer needs re-
mains a residual category relegated to the domestic sphere.
